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Abstract: In (in)formal learning scenarios, individuals should develop episte-
mological beliefs (i.e., individual conceptions about the nature of knowledge
and knowing) that are advantageous for understanding everyday science- and
health-related information. To date, researchers measuring how to foster stu-
dents’ discipline-specific epistemological beliefs have often tested researcher-
designed texts in short-term interventions. Applying this logic to audio-visual
stimuli, television clips might also affect (e.g., change) the epistemological be-
liefs of students. To test this assumption, three different television stimuli on
the subject of Alzheimer’s disease with varying levels depicting the presented
knowledge (as more advantageous, moderate, or less advantageous) were
therefore selected by means of a content analysis, and their effects tested on a
sample of 72 students using a pre-/post-test questionnaire. The results showed
some partial support for the assumption that the epistemological beliefs of par-
ticipants could become less advantageous when they are exposed to television
clips depicting knowledge as moderate or less advantageous.
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1 Introduction
It is often believed that students need, among other things, more advantageous
epistemological beliefs to better understand everyday science and health-relat-
ed information (Bromme and Kienhues, 2014; Conley, Pintrich, Vekiri, and Har-
rison, 2004).1 Epistemological beliefs are individual theories and conceptions
about the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer, 2001; Urhahne and Hopf,
2004), and are divided by some authors into the four dimensions certainty of
knowledge, simplicity of knowledge, source(s) of knowledge, and justification for
knowing (Hofer and Pintrich, 1997; see theoretical chapter).2 Epistemological
beliefs are an important field to study. Fostering more advantageous epistemo-
logical beliefs is perceived as an educational goal (Conley et al., 2004; Sinatra,
Kienhues, and Hofer, 2014; Urhahne and Hopf, 2004). In addition, modern soci-
eties make copious use of the advanced literacy and reasoning skills of their
individuals (Ashe, 2013). As more and more (and sometimes diverging) informa-
tion becomes accessible (in a knowledge-based society), individuals have to be
careful when making judgments, when deciding which source(s) to trust, and
when evaluating the given evidence of (scientific) claims (Bråten et al., 2011;
1 In this article, we refer to epistemological beliefs as more advantageous (when people pre-
dominantly believe that knowledge is changing, uncertain, and a well-reasoned outcome,
which is at the same time perceived to help them understand, handle new information, and
make better and knowledge-based decisions) or less advantageous (when people believe that
knowledge is more stable and certain) (see also Kienhues, Ferguson, and Stahl, 2016). While
research in this field commonly uses the terms “sophisticated” and “naïve” (Conley et al.,
2004; Kienhues, Bromme, and Stahl, 2008; Wegner, Weber, and Fischer, 2012) to describe the
range/continuum of epistemological beliefs, we believe that using the terms “less advanta-
geous” and “more advantageous” is to some degree less value-laden (see also Kienhues, Stad-
tler, and Bromme [2011], who used “less advanced” or “more advanced”, or Bråten, Britt,
Strømsø, and Rouet [2011]; however, despite this change in terminology, we refer to the same
approach that has been used by other researchers.
2 There are, however, different paradigmatic approaches to research in this field (e.g., Bråten
et al., 2011), as well as different terms to describe beliefs about the nature of knowledge and
knowing. “Epistemological beliefs” is, however, the most widely used term (see also Kienhues
et al., 2008). The most accepted definition of epistemological beliefs is that proposed by Hofer
and Pintrich (1997), which is an extension and reformulation of different research approaches,
such as Schommer’s (1990) five epistemological dimensions (see also Conley et al., 2004). It
should be added that recently, Kienhues et al. (2016) rather referred to “epistemic cognition”
(see also Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungavan [2011], who extended the framework used
by Hofer and Pintrich [1997], as well as Schommer-Aikins [2004] and Muis and Duffy [2013],
who introduced notions on the epistemic climate). With respect to Sinatra et al. (2014), epis-
temic cognition includes both epistemological beliefs and the application and/or influence of
these beliefs on everyday problems.
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Kienhues et al., 2016; Sinatra et al., 2014). Advantageous epistemological be-
liefs are then believed to increase understanding and to help people make bet-
ter decisions (see also Kienhues et al., 2011).
As a result, researchers design studies to foster more advantageous episte-
mological beliefs among individuals. For instance, some researchers who are
interested in epistemological change use researcher-designed texts as stimuli
in short-term interventions (Gill, Ashton, and Algina, 2004; Kienhues et al.,
2008). Applying this logic to real and audio-visual stimuli is relevant, since
television (TV) is currently among the most important and often the only source
that individuals use to inform themselves about science and health issues, and
this is especially true for a German audience (European Commission, 2013).
Watching TV programs and clips about science provides, to some degree, an
informal learning environment, as people watch these programs to be enter-
tained and informed, and learn from this (Kessler and Guenther, 2013; Kessler,
Guenther, and Ruhrmann, 2014; Lehmkuhl et al., 2012; Milde, 2009). In addi-
tion, TV clips about diverse issues are also part of formal learning scenarios,
for instance, health and science-related clips used in biology classes (for teach-
ers’ use of information and communications technology, see Mumtaz, 2006). If
the reception of such TV clips at home, at school, or university is conceptual-
ized as (in)formal learning scenarios, the clips may also be able to transmit
and change epistemological beliefs among students (Kessler and Guenther,
2013). This claim was tested in the study on which the present article is based.
In this article, three real-world and therefore authentic TV clips about Alz-
heimer’s disease (identified through a systematic content analysis [Kessler and
Guenther, 2013; Kessler et al., 2014]) depicting different levels of knowledge
representation (as more advantageous, moderate advantageous, or less advan-
tageous) were tested in a pre-/post-experiment set-up. Students’ epistemologi-
cal beliefs were measured before and after stimuli exposure to obtain a detailed
understanding of possible changes in beliefs in response to exposure to a TV
clip.
2 Theoretical review: Research on
epistemological beliefs
Epistemological beliefs are often defined as “an identifiable set of dimensions
of beliefs about knowledge and knowing, organized as theories, progressing in
reasonably predictable directions, activated in context, operating both cogni-
tively and metacognitively” (Hofer, 2010, p. 98). Epistemological beliefs are
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being given more and more attention by researchers in both psychology and
educational research (Conley et al., 2004; Kienhues et al., 2008, 2011; Sinatra
et al., 2014; Wegner et al., 2012), but not yet so much in communication re-
search. As an intuitive or naïve theory of science (Bromme and Kienhues, 2014),
epistemological beliefs can provide a basic orientation towards scientific infor-
mation (Sinatra et al., 2014). Epistemological beliefs influence, for instance:
− how adolescents and students comprehend and learn information (Hofer and
Pintrich, 1997; Wegner et al., 2012);
− how they integrate new knowledge into their existing knowledge base
(Jacobson and Spiro, 1995);
− how different information from multiple sources is integrated into an indi-
vidual’s coherent knowledge representation (Bråten et al., 2011; Ferguson,
Bråten, and Strømsø, 2012); and
− how people deal with contradictions and evaluate scientific evidence (Sina-
tra et al., 2014).
Hofer and Pintrich (1997) classify epistemological beliefs on the basis of four
contiguous, empirically supported dimensions, identified across several models
and defined as the core of many investigations (Hofer, 2001, 2004a; Hofer and
Pintrich, 1997). The first two dimensions represent the nature of knowledge
(i.e., what one believes knowledge is); the last two represent the nature or the
process of knowing (i.e., how one acquires knowledge) (Hofer and Pintrich,
1997), with each of the dimensions reflecting a continuum from less advanta-
geous to more advantageous (Hofer, 2004a). The first dimension is certainty of
knowledge – its perceived stability and certainty, compared to its uncertainty
and tentativeness (Conley et al., 2004). The tentativeness of science is one of
the foundations of scientific work (Popper, 1960; Sinatra et al., 2014). This di-
mension represents the degree to which knowledge is seen as fixed and abso-
lutely true or, in contrast, as temporary, growing, changing, and evolving. The
second dimension, simplicity of knowledge, refers to the continuum from a sim-
ple accumulation of facts to interrelated and potentially contradictory knowl-
edge. The third dimension refers to source(s) of knowledge. Knowledge can be
acquired from a single external source like an expert (e.g., a spokesperson) or
authority, or knowledge can be internally protected by the juxtaposition of mul-
tiple sources, such as research studies and scientific experts (Kessler et al.,
2014). The fourth dimension, justification for knowing, concerns the fact that
knowledge can be justified either scientifically or non-scientifically; according-
ly, this dimension explores the way information or data is weighted (Hofer and
Pintrich, 1997). All four dimensions are relevant to an individual’s understand-
ing of science (Sinatra et al., 2014).
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Many researchers have tried to identify factors that can foster more advan-
tageous epistemological beliefs among students and others. In this article and
regarding the argumentation to this point, we follow disparate models from an
educational psychology perspective (Kienhues et al., 2008; Kienhues et al.,
2016).3 Within this perspective, epistemological beliefs are perceived as multi-
dimensional and interrelated (Hofer, 2004b). It is further believed that indi-
viduals can simultaneously hold both more advantageous and less advanta-
geous views for different dimensions of epistemological beliefs (Kienhues et al.,
2008; Schommer, 1990; Schommer-Aikins, 2004), and that individuals can also
hold both general and discipline-specific (or even topic-specific) beliefs about
knowledge and knowing (Bråten et al., 2011; Hofer, 2010).
Research in both education and psychology has demonstrated that stu-
dents’ epistemological beliefs are significantly influenced by the mediation
styles (e.g., teaching methods) of their lecturers, as well as by how knowledge
is represented in teaching materials (Broughton, Sinatra, and Nussbaum, 2013;
Lombardi, Sinatra, and Nussbaum, 2013; Muis and Duffy, 2013; see also Hofer,
2004a). TV material, however, was not tested in these investigations. Although
researchers agree that epistemological beliefs develop and change over time,
the concrete mechanisms of this change have not yet been investigated in full
detail.
Conceptual change (i.e., the reorganizing of existing knowledge following
new experiences, which can lead to discrepancies) could be one of the underly-
ing mechanisms of changes in epistemological beliefs. See in this regard Dole
3 It should be mentioned that there are also models that follow a more resource-oriented
approach (Louca, Elby, Hammer, and Kagey, 2004) or a more developmental approach (Kuhn,
Cheney, and Weinstock, 2000; see also Kienhues et al., 2016). Within the developmental
approach, it is perceived that individuals change their epistemological beliefs across their life
span in a developmental fashion, characterized as a certain way of thinking in which beliefs
about different aspects are coherent and related to each other (Conley et al., 2004). As a result,
these beliefs will also change over time (see Kienhues et al., 2008). While this begins in early
adolescence, it continues into adulthood and is often related to age and educational level
(King and Kitchener, 2002; see also Bendixen and Rule, 2004). This developmental (and more
long-term) process normally starts with an absolutistic view positing certain, simple, and
stable knowledge, moving towards a multiplistic and evaluativistic view in which individuals
learn that knowledge is relativistic and uncertain (for an overview, see also Kienhues et al.,
2008; Rule and Bendixen, 2010; Schommer-Aikins, 2004). Bendixen and Rule (2004) highlight
that both developmental and disparate models can be united because epistemological thinking
develops and is multidimensional. With respect to the resource-oriented approach, it is
believed that epistemologies are made up of resources for understanding knowledge, which
are defined as units of cognitive structure at a finer grain size than beliefs (Louca et al., 2004;
see also Greene and Yu, 2014).
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and Sinatra (1998), Gill et al. (2004), Kienhues et al. (2008), Muis and Duffy
(2013), and Sinatra et al. (2014) for more information. According to Bendixen
and Rule (2004) and their integrated model of personal epistemology, mecha-
nisms of change consist of three interrelated components: epistemic doubt,
epistemic volition, and resolution strategies (see also Rule and Bendixen, 2010).
Epistemic doubt refers to the questioning of one’s beliefs and their validity at
any stage of epistemological development (Bendixen and Rule, 2004). Raised,
for instance, by receiving diverging information, epistemic doubt is believed to
lead to epistemic change. Introducing new and conflicting viewpoints to an
issue might trigger cognitive conflict, dissatisfaction, and dissonance in indi-
viduals. As a result, individuals’ epistemic change might become more likely
(Kienhues et al., 2016). Epistemic volition refers to direct effort needed to solve
this dissonance (and the responsibility an individual then has to take), while
resolution strategies comprise reflection and interaction processes (for more in-
formation, see Bråten et al., 2011; Bendixen and Rule, 2004; Rule and Bendixen,
2010; Kienhues et al., 2008). Bendixen and Rule (2004) also highlight that dis-
sonance and personal relevance, among others, are two isolated potential con-
ditions for epistemological change (see also Dole and Sinatra, 1998), while oth-
ers emphasize the role of emotions (Broughton et al., 2013) or plausibility
(Lombardi et al., 2013) when it comes to conceptual change (see also Rule and
Bendixen, 2010).
One stream of research that is interested in fostering epistemic change is
related to short-term interventions4 and direct exposure to conflicting knowl-
edge in a (researcher-designed) text (Kienhues et al., 2016). For research on
multiple texts, see, for instance, Ferguson et al. (2012).5 Research in this field
is probably the most similar to watching short TV clips in (in)formal learning
environments. That is why we wanted to review literature in this field in more
detail.
Gill et al. (2004) conducted an investigation into pre-service mathematics
teachers and found that those exposed to a refutational text,6 which included
4 For a research article observing changes of epistemological beliefs over a longer term, read-
ers are guided to Muis and Duffy (2013).
5 According to Kienhues et al. (2016, p. 323), a second set of instructional intervention studies
to foster epistemic change focuses on “experiences within constructivist, hands-on science
courses” (see also Conley et al., 2004).
6 Refutation texts are those texts that state widely-held assumptions and refute them by
presenting a more scientific explanation; thus, these texts are perceived as making individuals
question their own beliefs, and are likely to promote conceptual change (Broughton et al.
2013; Gill et al., 2004; Kienhues et al., 2008).
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causal arguments and multiple sources, were more likely to change their episte-
mological beliefs into more advantageous ones than those teachers exposed
to a standard textbook text with more accepted knowledge and less complex
epistemology. Kienhues et al. (2008) further noted that students who received
a refutational text outlining uncertainties and difficulties were more likely to
change their beliefs into more advantageous ones concerning the texture (e.g.,
the complexity) and variability (e.g., stability) of knowledge in genetics. Stu-
dents who received informational and one-sided instruction (a textbook pas-
sage) were, in turn, more likely to focus on a certain and stable view, even
changing their epistemological beliefs towards a less advantageous standpoint.
Further results of a study by Kienhues et al. (2011) revealed that different kinds
of information (i.e., consistent vs. conflicting representations) about cholesterol
evoked different beliefs in students. For instance, participants in the group that
was exposed to a text with conflicting claims (= more advantageous representa-
tion) were less certain of the ability of experts to come to a decision than were
participants in the group that was exposed to consistent claims (= less advanta-
geous representation).
These findings were applied to audio-visual stimuli in the present investi-
gation. Regarding informal learning contexts, TV is the main source of scientific
and medical information for the general public (European Commission, 2013),
with science TV programs7 among the favorite sources for German audiences
(Lehmkuhl et al., 2012). Regarding formal learning scenarios, TV clips are part
of teaching strategies in several school or university classes. Kessler and Guen-
ther (2013) assumed that clips from science TV programs could foster more or
less advantageous epistemological beliefs among audience members, depend-
ing on how those clips represent knowledge. In a first study, Kessler and Guen-
ther (2013) investigated a full sample of science and medicine-related TV clips
broadcast in German science TV programs. In line with the definition by Hofer
and Pintrich (1997), they conducted a content analysis investigating the four
epistemological dimensions: certainty of knowledge, simplicity of knowledge,
sources of knowledge, and justification for knowing (see also Kessler et al., 2014).
The authors found that there are indeed different representations of knowledge
in science TV programs. These styles vary in the extent to which they depict the
four dimensions (and thus, the represented knowledge) as more advantageous,
moderately advantageous, or less advantageous. To date, the effects of these
7 German science TV programs have been developed to inform audiences about diverse sci-
ence and medicine-related issues. Clips usually last two to three minutes, are presented by a
journalist, and are broadcast in the form of multiple TV clips with different thematic scopes
within one program (Milde, 2009).
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different representations of knowledge have not yet been investigated. That is
why the central research question (RQ) of the present study was:
[RQ] Can medicine- and science-related TV clips that vary in how they depict
knowledge (as more advantageous, moderately advantageous, or less ad-
vantageous) change students’ epistemological beliefs?
Research in education and psychology has indicated that stimuli (albeit almost
exclusively researcher-designed texts) can change individual discipline-specific
epistemological beliefs in short-term interventions (Gill et al., 2004; Kienhues
et al., 2008; Kienhues et al., 2011). Materials depicting knowledge more advan-
tageously tend to encourage more advantageous beliefs by individuals, while
materials depicting knowledge less advantageously tend to encourage less ad-
vantageous beliefs. That is why we stated the following hypotheses (Hs):
[H1] A science TV clip depicting knowledge more advantageously fosters more
advantageous epistemological beliefs among students.
[H2] A science TV clip depicting knowledge less advantageously leads to less
advantageous epistemological beliefs among students.
3 Method
3.1 Design, participants, and procedure
This study was part of a more extensive eye-tracking experiment, in which 72
students participated (Kessler and Guenther, 2017). The students were recruited
on the campus of Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany, by randomly
inviting people to take part in the study. When the participants arrived at the
media laboratory they received a paper-and-pencil pre-survey questionnaire
measuring their epistemological beliefs (Time One = t1), since surveying was
found to be an established technique when investigating epistemological be-
liefs (Hofer, 2004b).8 The important covariates of topic-related involvement,
8 It should be added, however, that there are different methodological approaches when
investigating epistemological beliefs and that self-reporting instruments, such as surveys,
although being regarded as an established instrument, have been criticized in the research
literature (Greene and Yu, 2014). Urhahne and Hopf (2004) highlight that especially those
researchers who follow the perception that epistemological beliefs are multidimensional are
the ones using survey measurements.
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Figure 1: Design of the pre/post-test experiment. Participants watched one of three TV clips
about Alzheimer’s disease. These clips varied in their level of depicting knowledge, which
was assessed based on a content analysis (Kessler and Guenther, 2013; Kessler et al.,
2014). EG = experimental group.
need for cognition, need for cognitive closure, and sociodemographics (Kien-
hues et al., 2008; Sinatra et al., 2014) were measured at t1. Participants were
then randomly divided into three experimental groups (EGs), each associated
with one of three TV clips that varied in in how they represented knowledge
(TV clip 1 = more advantageous representation, TV clip 2 = moderate represen-
tation, TV clip 3 = less advantageous representation) (see Figure 1).
Since only one of the computers in the researchers’ media laboratory was
equipped with the remote eye-tracking tool (SensoMotoric Instruments [SMI]
iView X Red, 120 Hz) and the appropriate software, all participants set up indi-
vidual appointments with the researchers. The eye-tracking software, controlled
by the researchers, was used as a compliance check in this study, confirming
that participants really watched the stimuli material. Participants’ eyes fixation9
needed to remain on the screen for at least 95% of the TV clip presentation.
A calibration and validation procedure before stimuli exposure ensured that
participants’ eyes (i.e., their fixation) were indeed focused on the stimuli (deri-
vation x:M = .47; SD = .22; derivation y:M = .47; SD = .21). After stimuli presenta-
tion, an on-screen post-survey questionnaire re-measured the participants’ epis-
temological beliefs (Time Two = t2), repeating the same questions as before, but
with a randomized order. The experiments took approximately 15 minutes each.
Students in this study were, on average, 24 years old (M = 24.12; SD = 3.03),
and almost two thirds (63%) were female. Most of the students were in their
9 Fixation refers to the foveal attention on an object, and is perceived as the precise point of
focus. Individual fixations typically have a duration of 100 to 600 milliseconds.
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second (31%), fourth (25%), or sixth (21%) semester. The study fields of the
students represented a wide variety of mostly humanities (16%) and social
sciences (68%). There were no medical students among the participants. Based
on a chi-square test for gender and field of study, and analyses of variance
(ANOVAs, for the covariates), the EGs did not differ significantly in terms of
any of these variables, indicating that groups were successfully randomized.
3.2 Stimulus materials
A content analysis (Kessler and Guenther, 2013; Kessler et al., 2014) was used
to extract three different stimuli. The three video clips were all approximately
three minutes in length and on the topic of Alzheimer’s disease,10 but with
respect to the four dimensions (see Hofer and Pintrich, 1997) of epistemological
beliefs, they varied in their level of knowledge representation. The assumption
was therefore that the clips would affect the epistemological beliefs of the par-
ticipants differently. The measured content analytic variables with respect to
the four epistemological dimensions were the representation of the (un)certain-
ty of scientific findings, the way controversy is depicted, the number of sources
or actors, and (un)scientific justification of the knowledge provided (for a full
description, see Table 1).
Participants in EG1 (n = 21) watched a clip with a clear focus on science
and its benefits (TV clip 1). This clip dealt with the chemical methylene blue,
which might aid research on Alzheimer’s disease. Ten years of research were
summarized in this clip, which presented some evidence that this medication
could help mice diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease. However, this clip also
depicted uncertain findings and controversy. In comparison to the other two
clips, this clip was classified by the content analysis as the most advantageous
in its representation of knowledge.
Participants in EG2 (n = 25) watched a clip (TV clip 2) on a new scientific
finding about the risks of developing Alzheimer’s disease. Tests with mice had
indicated that proteins could be external causes of the disease, making Alz-
heimer’s disease infectious. However, this clip represented the opinions and
results of only one scientist, and the finding had not been confirmed in any
testing with humans. This TV clip was therefore rated as moderately advanta-
geous in how it depicted knowledge with respect to the content analysis.
10 Research in this area contains a mixture of both well-established and developing knowl-
edge, with many unanswered questions. Furthermore, students have some knowledge about
Alzheimer’s disease, but of course, they are not experts. This was therefore an ideal subject
for the present investigation.
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Participants in EG3 (n = 26) watched a clip (TV clip 3) that offered basic infor-
mation about Alzheimer’s disease, with no research-related information. The
clip compared how cells age naturally compared to how they age in persons
with Alzheimer’s disease, and this was stated as scientifically certain fact. The
course of the disease was depicted in a case study, with a grandfather as the
main actor. This clip was therefore classified by the content analysis as repre-
senting knowledge as less advantageous.
To ensure the successful classification of the TV clips, a manipulation
check was used to test the different representations of knowledge with respect
to the four epistemological dimensions (Hofer and Pintrich, 1997), also using a
student sample.11 The use of real TV clips in this investigation was beneficial
because it increased the external validity of the experiment.
3.3 Measurement of variables
Epistemological beliefs were measured specifically for medical knowledge with
three items per dimension (12 items in total). Items were adapted from Urhahne
and Hopf (2004), who translated and validated the questionnaire of Conley et
al. (2004). We used a 6-point Likert-type scale (α = .75, both t1 and t2) to assess
participants’ degree of agreement from 1 (total disagreement) to 6 (total agree-
ment). An example item was: “To make results more certain, it is important to
perform experiments more than once”. Although a confirmatory factor analysis
using principal component analysis and varimax rotation (KMO = 0.62) resulted
in four factors, the results did not perfectly replicate the classification proposed
by Hofer and Pintrich (1997) or the one suggested by Urhahne and Hopf (2004).
11 For a manipulation check, to confirm that the chosen TV clips were accurately perceived
as representing knowledge differently, 56 students (Mage= 21.79, SDage = 2.05, 80% female)
from Friedrich Schiller University in Jena, Germany, who were unfamiliar with the purpose of
the study, were divided into three groups. Each group was then exposed to one of the identi-
fied TV clips. The participants were asked to indicate, using a 5-point Likert-type scale, how
each clip represented the perceived certainty (dimension 1; F(2; 52) = 13.699; p < 0.001; η2 =
.34), controversy (dimension 2, F(2; 52) = 13.942; p < 0.001; η2 = .35), number of sources (dimen-
sion 3), and justification for knowing (dimension 4, F(2; 52) = 3.035; p < 0.1; η2 = .10), as well
as the comprehensibility and emotionality of the TV clips. Each media stimulus was rated by
a minimum of 16 people. Analyses of variance revealed that the TV clips were perceived
differently and in line with the classification of more advantageous, moderately advantageous,
and less advantageous for three of the four epistemological dimensions by Hofer and Pintrich
(1997). As desired, the clips were not found to differ with regard to comprehensibility or
emotionality.
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The first factor (4 items) represented the source(s) of knowledge dimension (ei-
genvalue = 3.45, explaining 29% of the variance). The second factor (4 items)
was the certainty of knowledge dimension (eigenvalue = 1.68, explaining 14%
of the variance). The third factor (2 items) was the justification for knowing
dimension (eigenvalue = 1.40, explaining 12% of the variance), while the fourth
factor (2 items) was the development of knowledge dimension (eigenvalue = 1.12,
explaining 9% of the variance).
The research literature also suggested measurement of important covariates
(Kienhues et al., 2008; Sinatra et al., 2014).12 Need for cognition was measured
on the same 6-point Likert-type scale (M = 25.63; SD = 5.93; α = .75) using ten
items adapted from Bless, Fellhauer, Bohner, and Schwarz (1991). An example
item was: “I really enjoy the task of finding new solutions to problems”. The
total additive index for these 10 items ranged from 0 to 60. Need for cognitive
closure was measured on the same 6-point Likert-type scale (M = 49.26; SD =
9.99; α = .81) using 16 items adapted from Schlink and Walther (2007). An
example item – this one, reverse-coded – was: “I do not like it when the state-
ments of persons are ambiguous”. The additive index for these 16 items ranged
from 0 to 96. Issue-related involvement was measured using eight 5-point se-
mantic differentials (M = 19.69; SD = 5.32; α = .83). Items were adapted from
McQuarrie and Munson (1992) and assessed perceptions of Alzheimer’s disease
(e.g., as interesting or important). The additive index for these eight items
ranged from 0 to 40.
On a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from very negative (1) to very posi-
tive (5), the survey also measured how participants evaluated research on Alz-
heimer’s disease (M = 3.81; SD = 0.99). Since the present study had a clear
medical focus, we asked participants about their past experiences with medi-
cine (M = 3.56; SD = 0.95), using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from nega-
tive (1) to positive (5) as well as their degree of interest in medical research
findings (M = 3.74; SD = 0.84), to which they responded on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from not at all (1) to very much (5). Participants were asked
how often they watched clips from science TV programs, on a 5-point Likert-
type scale ranging from never (1) to quite often (5). Only 10% of them watched
science TV programs on a regular basis (M = 2.46; SD = 0.93).13 They were also
asked to provide sociodemographic information.
12 The role of more motivational factors when assessing a change in epistemological beliefs
has been discussed in the research literature on conceptual change (Dole and Sinatra, 1998;
see also Kienhues et al., 2008; Sinatra et al., 2014). Some authors also discussed the moderat-
ing role of sociodemographics (Conley et al., 2004).
13 This finding contradicts the popularity of science TV programs. This could, however, be
related to the use of a student sample or to the fact that we asked for regular viewing behavior.
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4 Results
A more detailed look at participants’ epistemological beliefs in the pre-survey
questionnaire (t1) showed that the most advantageous views the students had
were related to the dimensions certainty of knowledge (M = 21.85; SD = 2.00;
range 4 to 24) and development of knowledge (M = 11.22; SD = .93; range 2 to
12), with only slightly lower values for the source(s) of knowledge (M = 18.18;
SD = 3.70; range 4 to 24) and justification for knowing dimensions (M = 9.89;
SD = 1.55; range 2 to 12).14
Repeated-measures ANOVAs (see also Table 2) revealed differences in epis-
temological beliefs between the two measurement points for three of the four
epistemological dimensions, answering the RQ and working towards respond-
ing to the hypotheses.
For the source(s) of knowledge dimension, a small but significant difference
emerged between the two measurement points (F(1; 67) = 20.072; p < .001; η2 =
.04). Examination of the detailed comparison for each EG showed that there
was no change in this epistemological dimension for the experimental condi-
tion exposed to the TV clip classified as representing knowledge as more advan-
tageous (EG1). However, there were significant differences for the conditions in
which students saw the TV clip representing knowledge as moderately advanta-
geous (EG2; F(1; 25) = 17.427; p < .001; η2 = .12) and less advantageous (EG3;
F(1; 22) = 12.000; p < .01; η2 = .08). In both groups, there was a rather small
14 Regarding individual items assessing the dimension source(s) of knowledge (all items
reverse-coded), the participants did not agree that there was only one solution to medical
experiments (M = 1.46; SD = .68). They also did not believe that everything they read in
medical books was true (M = 2.91; SD = 1.44) or that they had to believe the findings of
medical experts (M = 2.34; SD = 1.20). Their agreement was slightly higher regarding whether
only medical experts know what is true in the field of medicine (M = 3.10; SD = 1.35). With
respect to the dimension simplicity of knowledge (first two items reverse-coded), participants
did not agree that almost everything is known in the field of medicine (M = 1.33; SD = .58) or
that medical experts agree on what they see as the true facts of their field of expertise (M =
1.66; SD =.85). The students understood that there were open questions in the field of medicine
that medical experts cannot yet answer (M = 5.64; SD = .59) and they agreed that there is
more than one way for those in the medical field to verify beliefs (M = 5.19; SD = .80). Regard-
ing justification for knowing, participants agreed that it is important to repeat experiments to
validate findings (M = 5.54; SD =.84). Their agreement was slightly lower regarding whether
experiments are a good way to reach results (M = 4.36; SD = .99). Finally, regarding the
development of knowledge dimension, participants agreed that new discoveries could change
what medical professionals perceive to be true (M = 5.42; SD = .72) and that more recent
medicine-related beliefs may differ from past beliefs (M = 5.81; SD =.39).
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Table 2: Means of epistemological dimensions for pre- and post-survey measurement.
Epistemological dimensions Groups Pre-survey test (t1) Post-survey test (t2)
M SD M SD
Source(s) of knowledge EG1 16.15 4.17 16.05 3.36
EG2 18.68*** 3.17 16.32*** 3.35
EG3 19.45** 3.13 17.63** 3.21
Certainty of knowledge EG1 21.60** 2.16 20.65** 2.13
EG2 22.24** 1.76 21.00** 2.08
EG3 21.63** 2.15 20.59** 2.26
Justification for knowing EG1 9.75* 2.03 10.80* 1.00
EG2 10.08 1.38 10.44 1.00
EG3 9.82 1.26 9.82 1.05
Development of knowledge EG1 11.15 1.04 11.10 .85
EG2 11.20 .82 11.28 .98
EG3 11.22 9.34 11.36 1.00
Note: EG1 = more advantageous representation of knowledge; EG2 = moderate advan-
tageous representation, EG3 = less advantageous representation. *** = p < .001;
** = p < .01; * = p < .05.
decrease of means (see Table 2). This led us to the assumption that for this
epistemological dimension, we gained no support for H1, but some support for
H2.
For the certainty of knowledge dimension, a small but significant difference
occurred between the two measurement points as well (F(1; 67) = 36.738; p < .01;
η2 = .07). Looking at the groups we found that there was a decrease of means for
this dimension for all experimental conditions: Significant and small decreases
emerged (see also Table 2) for EG1 (F(1; 20) = 10.408; p < .01; η2 = .05), EG2
(F(1; 25) = 14.290; p < .01; η2 = .10) and EG3 (F(1; 22) = 13.664; p < .01; η2 =
.06). This finding, again, gave no support for H1, but some for H2.
The small differences emerging for the justification for knowing dimension
between the two measurement points (F(1; 67) = 9.516; p < .01; η2 = .03) were
related – when looking at the groups individually – to a small increase of
means in EG1 (more advantageous representation of knowledge (F(1; 20) =
7.912; p < .05; η2 = .10), supporting H1. No differences were found for the other
groups (moderate or less advantageous representation of knowledge), not sup-
porting H2.
Similar tests with the development of knowledge dimension did not show
significant differences either. For none of the epistemological belief dimensions
was there any interference from the covariates.
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.02.18 12:16
DE GRUYTER MOUTON496 Lars Guenther and Sabrina H. Kessler
5 Discussion
Information about science and health is important in daily life for all societies
that are highly dependent on their knowledge. Such information can have a
significant influence on many everyday decisions (Bromme and Kienhues, 2014;
Sinatra et al., 2014). Research in education and psychology supports the impor-
tance of fostering more advantageous epistemological beliefs among students
(Conley et al., 2004; Sinatra et al., 2014; Urhahne and Hopf, 2004).
In this study, we considered whether TV clips are able to foster more advan-
tageous epistemological beliefs among students. Television has a social role in
providing education; therefore, TV clips might be able to transfer epistemologi-
cal understandings (Kessler and Guenther, 2013). Although the observed differ-
ences at the two measurement points were rather small and did not fully sup-
port or reject the hypotheses, it should be highlighted that, against the
background of recent research working with researcher-designed texts in most-
ly formal learning scenarios (Kienhues et al., 2008; Kienhues et al., 2011), the
effects reported in this article are based on real-world and thus authentic mate-
rial. In addition, the interventions were presented once only and they were
each just about three minutes in length. While these were only short interven-
tions, they were still realistic since German science TV program clips are de-
signed this way (Milde, 2009).
Students who watched a TV clip depicting knowledge of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease as more advantageous did not appear to change their epistemological be-
liefs. A small effect only was observed for the justification for knowing dimen-
sion. Students in this group were also among the participants perceiving
medical knowledge after exposure as slightly more certain than before, a find-
ing contrary to what was expected. Regarding the conceptual change literature,
there is a chance that the chosen TV clip for this group, although being classi-
fied as a more advantageous representation of knowledge, was not able to lead
to cognitive discrepancies and dissonance; thus, also not to conceptual change.
Although discussing both certain and uncertain research findings, certain find-
ings might have been more dominant and important for certain viewers, lead-
ing to this finding. On the other hand, this clip introduced a large number of
varying actors discussing various standpoints, which could have led to a weak
change in the justification for knowing dimension. Overall, since participants,
in general, already had more advantageous epistemological beliefs before expo-
sure, the TV clip might just have confirmed what they already knew.
In contrast, in two dimensions (source(s) of knowledge and certainty of
knowledge) we found some partial support for the assumption that TV clips
depicting knowledge as moderately advantageous or less advantageous lead to
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a decrease in epistemological beliefs among the students. This is to some de-
gree in line with current research (Kienhues et al., 2008). The finding was also
hypothesized. Results could have been based on the fact that both clips showed
one actor only and represented knowledge as rather certain.
In sum, the present study did not offer a clear answer on whether or not
the representation of knowledge in TV clips can change students’ epistemologi-
cal beliefs into more or less advantageous ones. Since this study – to the au-
thors’ knowledge – is the first one exploring changes of epistemological beliefs
caused by audio-visual stimuli (i.e., TV clips), it can be a starting point for
interesting approaches in this relevant field of research.
This study had a number of notable limitations, necessitating more re-
search in this field. The use of a small sample comprising university students
only was of course not representative and might have resulted in overall highly
advantageous epistemological beliefs before exposure to stimuli. If the sample
had contained younger students, probably with less advantageous epistemolog-
ical beliefs before experimental exposure, the TV clip classified as representing
more advantageous knowledge might have had a more significant effect. It is
therefore important to repeat this experiment with different samples. It should
also be highlighted that, although this experiment was aimed at having a suc-
cessful randomization of participants in the EGs, as can be seen in Table 2, the
students had different starting points in the source(s) of knowledge dimension
of epistemological beliefs. This might have affected the results as well, requir-
ing further replication of the experiment.
In addition, the study methodology did not allow the researchers to deter-
mine whether the measured effects were short or long term. An experimental
design repeating the survey at different points in time would allow this addi-
tional information to be gathered. Furthermore, the time difference between
measurements before and after the research might be of concern. We suggest
that future research allows more time to pass before repeating the research in
order to measure epistemological beliefs. There was also no measurement of
prior knowledge about the subject as a potential covariate (Bråten et al., 2011;
Kienhues et al., 2008) in this investigation. This should be included in future
research. Using eye-tracking as a compliance check might have benefits, but
could be extended (e.g., by surveying what participants remember about the
clip after exposure).
The TV clips were specific to Alzheimer’s disease and there were differences
in how they portrayed the subject. While clip 1 was related to the treatment of
the disease, the other two clips focused on the development and causes of the
disease. By using a more extended sample for content analysis, this important
limitation might be avoided. The content analysis used for this investigation
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 01.02.18 12:16
DE GRUYTER MOUTON498 Lars Guenther and Sabrina H. Kessler
also did not measure whether the pictures as presented in the clips contained
different levels of epistemological image. The authors of this study, therefore,
hope that other researchers will include the degree of epistemology presented
in pictures into their future analyses.
Epistemological beliefs that were measured in this study were domain-spe-
cific and therefore strictly related to the area of medicine. The results can there-
fore not be generalized. In addition, participants were in a laboratory to take
part in the experiment. While we think that this was reasonable keeping in
mind that the eye-tracking ensured that the presented TV clips were watched
by the students, we encourage other researchers to repeat this experiment in
different settings.
Lastly, there have been calls for mixed-methods approaches. The present
study could be supplemented by – for instance – thinking-aloud methodologies
(Ferguson et al., 2012) or qualitative interviews (Greene and Yu, 2014). It would
also be interesting to repeat this investigation in a classroom scenario in which
the lecturer discusses the content of the TV clips with the students (as in
Broughton et al., 2013), for example, also after exposure to multiple clips that
depict knowledge very differently (Ferguson et al., 2012). In these investiga-
tions, underlying mechanisms of change (Rule and Bendixen, 2010) might also
be understood better. This is highly important since, in current knowledge soci-
eties, more advantageous epistemological beliefs are believed to function as a
lens through which individuals absorb new information, and these beliefs are
therefore crucial for information reception processes.
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